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Whistleblowing is the act of disclosing information from a public institution or private organisation 
with the purpose of revealing cases of corruption or secrecy that are of immediate or potential danger to 
the public interest. When systems of public control and accountability fail, whistleblowing is a measure 
of last resort against corruption and unrestrained secrecy, and should then be granted legal protection. 
This study argues that the European Union should stand up for the legal protection of whistleblowers and 
encourage their contribution towards more transparent institutions and economic transactions. To this 
purpose, it outlines a set of policy recommendations for the introduction of a European Directive in this 
field.  
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Introduction 
Whistleblowing is the act of disclosing information from a public institution (such as a 
government) or private organisation (such as a corporation) with the purpose of revealing cases 
of corruption or secrecy that are of immediate or potential danger to the public interest. 
According to its advocates, when systems of public control and accountability fail, 
whistleblowing can be a measure of last resort unrestrained secrecy. Even more importantly, 
whistleblowers have a crucial role in exposing cases of public and private corruption, thus they 
should then be granted legal protection. Critics have contested this argument arguing that 
whistleblowers undermine rather than strengthen democracy. The protection of whistleblowing 
is provided by some governments through independent agencies that provide a channel through 
which employees and applicant for government employment may make confidential 
disclosures. While some legal protections can be also found in someEuropean countries in the 
attempt to curb corruption, a European legal framework is absent, leaving often whistleblowers 
unprotected under the European law. In this report we will address the role of whistleblowing 
both in revealing cases of illegitimate state secrecy and in fighting corruption, and propose 
some policy guidelines towards an European Directive on this matter.  
1. What is Whistleblowing?  
We can identify two kinds of whistleblowing: government whistleblowing; and 
whistleblowing as an anti-corruption measure, both within the public and the private sector.  
Government whistleblowing arises when an individual within or outside the institution, 
reveals information that pertains to public interest. In doing so the person often violates the 
confines of legal duty but fulfils the duty of upholding just institutions by revealing democratic 
violations that arise due to secrecy. Government whistleblowing stands testimony to the fact 
that often institutional and constitutional checks might not be sufficient to control excesses that 
result from secrecy, that dissent of the kind that reveals secret information strengthens 
democratic institutions when the information is of public interest. Despite this crucial role in 
making the operations of governments more transparent, in many countries blowing the whistle 
carries high personal risk, especially when legal protection is absent, or control on information 
and defamation laws act as a deterrent. Moreover, in some cases whistleblowing does also carry 
connotations of betrayal, particularly when these charges take the form of legal prosecution 
under treason laws. Edward Snowden, Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning are exemplary 
cases in this regard. However, many politicians and commentators have argued that this way of 
thinking is wrong. 1Law-abiding citizens should not be worried to be subjected to investigations 
or surveillance when they have nothing to hide. Limitations of these practices should not come 
primarily from the remote fear of potential threat to rights, but from the threats to national 
security. This was the case in the immediate aftermath of September 11, when a new political 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of this point, see Adam Moore, "Privacy, Security, and Government Surveillance: Wik-
iLeaks and the New Accountability,” Public Affairs Quarterly, 25, 2011: 141-156. See also Solove, Dan-
iel J. "'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy." San Diego Law Review, Vol. 
44, 2007.  
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agenda was set to limit civil liberties to an extent formerly inconceivable. This shift was 
primarily enacted through an anti-terrorism legislation, such as the US Patriot and Homeland 
Security Acts.  
In Europe, the rights of whistleblowers against governments have been upheld in some 
important judicial decisions. To be sure, no major judgment in this matter has ever been issued 
by the European Court of Justice, but we can find some landmark cases in the European Court 
of Human Rights. The most important case of government whistleblowing is Bucur and Toma v. 
Romania (40238/02, 8.1.2013), concerning the criminal conviction for public irregular 
telephone tapping procedures.2 
 
Bucur and Toma v. Romania (40238/02, 8.1.2013)
 
Facts  
Constantin  Bucur  was  an  employee  in  the  Romanian  Intelligence  Service  (SRI)  responsible  for 
recording  the wiretapped  telephone  communications,  including  those of  journalists  and politicians. 
Believing  that  this  activity  was  unlawful,  he  consulted  about  with  the  head  of  his  department, 
receiving just but a reprimanded. Consequently, he approached a Parliament Representative in order 
to find a proper channel of disclosure  in the House of Representatives. He was suggested  instead of 
contacting  the  press.  In  May  1996  he  held  a  press  conference  in  which  he  released  some  audio 
cassettes containing telephone communications of several journalists and politicians. In July 1996, he 
appeared in front of a military court indicted for having collected and transmitted secret information, 
in  violation of Article 19 of  the Romanian National  Security  Law,  and having disclosed  and  illegally 
used information obtained in the exercise of its functions relating to the privacy of others (Article 21 
of  the  same  Act).  Bucur  defended  his  actions  by  arguing  that  the  disclosed  information  did  not 
constitute state secrets but  rather evidence of attempted political manipulation by  the SRI.  In April 
1997 Micea Toma, a  journalist who had been wiretapped, was heard by the court, claiming that his 
rights  had  been  violated.  In  October  1998,  the  military  court  sentenced  Bucur  to  two  years  of 
imprisonment for theft and illegal disclosure of secret information or information relating to privacy, 
honor and reputation. The case was appealed, but the Romanian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 
Bucur  and  Toma  applied  to  the  European  court  of Human  Rights.  Bucur  claimed  that  his  criminal 
conviction interfered with his freedom to expression under Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, and  that  the  lack of  impartiality  in  the military  court violated his  right  to a  fair  trial 
under Article 6 (para. 121). Toma claimed that the government violated their Article 8 right to respect 
for  private  and  family  life  and  correspondence  because  personal  conversations  at  their  home  had 
been made public. 
 
Decision 
The  court  judged  that while  the Government’s  aim  in  granting  to national  security was  legitimate, 
interference was not necessary  in a democratic society when  the  information  imparted was of such 
significant  public  importance.  The  court  also  concluded  that  Bucur  had  legitimate  grounds  for 
believing  that the  information he disclosed was  true and that the public  interest  in disclosing  illegal 
conduct outweighed the interest of maintaining public confidence in the SRI, and that Bucur had acted 
in good faith 8).  
 
(Source: right2info.org. Case report available at: 
http://www.right2info.org/cases/plomino_documents/r2i‐bucur‐and‐toma‐v.‐romania )  
                                                 
2 Another important case is Guja v. Moldova (14277/04, 12 February 2008) in which the Grand Chamber 
considered the dismissal of a civil servant who had leaked information revealing political pressure on the 
judiciary in a corruption case. 
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Beside disclosures of government’s information, we also said that whistleblowing is also 
important in fighting corruption. Corruption has two main unwelcome consequences: it 
deprives local and national constituencies from funds that could be used for service, 
infrastructure, education, and cause an uncontrolled rise in public expenditure, exacerbating 
inequalities; moreover, it prompts generalised distrust in public institutions and their capacity to 
enforce fair rules.3 Tendency to corruption are often linked to the lack of institutional control, 
which allows elite powers to manipulate and privatise resources for their benefit. When public 
officials and private actors engage in practices of corruption, often the only appeal to justice 
depends on those conscientious individuals bearing witness and providing testimony to the 
wrongs done. Whistleblowers who share information with competent authorities unveil the 
secrecy that feeds corruption. Therefore, the crucial function of whistleblowers is to reveal 
information that would be otherwise not available to either concerned authorities or the public. 
Current laws at domestic, European, and international level tend to provide some protection for 
whistleblowers who in the private and public sector that report cases of corruption. In the next 
section we will briefly review them.  
2. An Ethics of Whistleblowing 
The growing role of whistleblowers in exposing government lack of accountability has 
raised a debate among political theorists, legal scholars, policy-makers, activists, and even in 
judicial decisions over the moral right to blow the whistle. Since the category of whistleblowing 
does not have a precise categorisation in many legislations, defining the criteria of legitimacy is 
quite crucial to identify also the legal right to its protection. Here are some criteria that we may 
find from a short review of the debate.  
Adequate information backed by evidence 
Since blowing the whistle implies leaking confidential information, the potential 
whistleblower should be sure that the act will be successful in reaching his target, let it be the 
public opinion, law enforcement authorities or some special committee deputed to assess the 
truthfulness of the information. Moreover, the revelation should be as informative as possible, 
and the whistleblower should provide only information that he knows to be truthful, including 
supporting evidence for what he is reporting. 
Whistleblowing comes also in different forms: it can be anonymous, when the identity of the 
whistleblower is left undisclosed, or disclosed only internally to the organisation the 
whistleblower is a member of. Depending on the nature of the information being disclosed and 
                                                 
3 The Italian Court of Auditors estimate that the cost of corruption to Italian economy amounts to 60bln 
euros per annum. The same amount projected at EU level provides an estimate of 120bln euros loss. 
However, it must be noted that these estimates are based on the corruption perception indexes. The real 
amount of the damage to private and public sectors could be sensibly higher. For the method of calcula-
tion of the cost of corruption, see the Transparency International’s overview by country, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (accessed on September 2, 2015).  
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the risk blowing the whistle carries on, anonymity is sometimes crucial to protect the whistler. 
Yet, some contend that identity should be revealed when the leak of information is of political 
nature as opposed to reporting cases of corruption. In either case, partly because of the absence 
of an adequate protection, the enactment of legal guarantees of whistleblowers have become an 
urgent matter in the last years. Since cases of whistleblowing may differ depending on the 
nature of the wrong being disclosed, we need first to properly distinguish their features.  
The good faith test 
Many political theorists and legal scholars claim that his intention should be in good faith, 
that is the whistleblower should leak information only when he or she does it for moral reasons.4 
This can mean two things: first, the whistleblower should believe in the supreme value of truth 
and have a moral intention to disclose injustice. However, this principle might be too 
demanding. For instance, when people who want to reveal sensible information are left alone 
without adequate protection, or are even isolated in their work environment because they are not 
‘trusted’, they may consider the consequences of ruining their life in the name of an abstract 
principle. This is an important consideration that people in flesh-and-blood have the right to 
make when they decide to expose a wrong, and even themselves.  
Perhaps, we can say something different: a good way to test the moral intention of the 
whistleblower is not to ask if he or she is ready to ruin his/her life in the name of an abstract 
principle of truth or justice, but rather how much bad consequences she/he is ready to accept. 
Moreover, we shouldn’t be too moralistic in believing that to be moral one should also be pure 
in his intentions. For instance, if an employee knows that his boss is part of a ring of corruption, 
and he is resentful against him because  say  he didn’t obtain a promotion, he may decide to 
blow the whistle on his boss. Some people would say that he was not moral because he did it 
instrumentally. But, one may also say that she/he after all reported a wrong, and he put himself 
at risk.  
Here is a test that can perhaps help to understand what is the minimum level of morality she 
should expect from whistleblowers: we can say that the potential harm the whistleblower may 
suffer by disclosing the information should be higher than any individual benefit he may receive 
from it. The test may be difficult to run in some cases, but still it gives us an idea of what we 
can reasonably mean by saying that, in order to have moral right to blow the whistle, the 
potential whistleblower should act in good faith.  
We said that a second important feature of whistleblowing is that the information being 
leaked must be relevant. What does it mean exactly? For instance, consider employee leak 
information of a corrupted boss through internal channels of disclosures (say, the corporation 
                                                 
4 See Richard Moberly & Lindsey E. Wylie, “An Empirical Study of Whistleblower Policies in United 
States Corporate Codes of Ethics”, in David Lewis & Wim Vandekerckhove (eds), Whistleblowing and 
Democratic Values, International Whistleblowing Research Network, p. 42. The UK Public Interest Dis-
closure Act has recently removed ‘good faith’ from the requirement of disclosures. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/work-blog/2013/jun/25/whistleblowing-public-interest-edward-
snowden 
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office deputed to reviews cases of corruption). In such case, we should say that this information 
should be relevant to the interests of the corporation, not necessarily the interests of the all 
stake-holders or citizens at large. But consider now a government whistleblower like Chelsea 
Manning or Edward Snowden. Who did they reveal the information to? Both contacted a public 
disclosure channel, that is they ultimately wanted to make information available to the public. 
So, in the first case nobody would really raise an objection: the employee is indeed protecting 
the interests of his/her firm, and perhaps (but not always) the interests of stake-holders and 
citizens more in general. The second instance is more complicated, for the government 
whistleblower that leaks secret government information does damage the institution he works 
for.  
Many believe therefore the we should only grant protection to whistleblowers of the first 
kind, and treat those of the second kind as traitors or spies. The question is open, but here is 
another proposal we should keep in mind. When government whistleblowers leak information, 
what we should look at is not only their moral intention, but whether they contribute to the 
interests of the community, nation or state they are members of. Call it public interest.  
The public interest  
What is public interest? In a very general way it is an interest that every member of a 
community has a stake in.5 Some interests are private, like properties one owns, but the right to 
property is in the public interest: it is something everybody cares about. My privacy is a private 
interest, but the right to privacy is a public concern.  
So, let’s say that something is the public interest when he cannot be guaranteed by law 
unless everybody has the same access to the right. When the employer reports a case of 
corruption, he may contribute to the interests of the company he works for, but certainly cannot 
act against the public interest. Likewise, when the whistleblower leaks secret information of 
state wrongs, he must do it knowing that those information might be relevant to the public at 
large. For instance, they can be information concerning now a state intrudes in people’s private 
data.  
Anonymity. Pros and Cons  
One last point before concluding this section: since anonymity is a complex matter, we 
should be careful in saying that only whistleblowers who go public should have a right to legal 
protection. Many believe that the moral whistleblower that is entitled to legal protection only 
                                                 
5 On public interest , see Barry, Brian. 1990 [1965]. Political argument: A reissue with a new introduc-
tion. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf; Bok, S. (1984), Secrets: on the Ethics of Concealment and Reve-
lation, Pantheon Books; Downs, A. (1962). The public interest: Its meaning in a democracy. Social Re-
search,  
29, 1-36; Flathman, R. J. (1966). The public interest: An essay concerning the normative discourse of pol-
itics. New York: John Wiley; King, S., Chilton B.S., Roberts, G. E.
 
(2010) Reflections on Defining the 
Public Interest,, Administration & Society 41(8) 954–978; Held, Virginia. 1970. The public interest and 
individual interests. New York: Basic Books; O’Flynn, I (2010), “Deliberating About the Public Interest” 
Res Publica 16:299–315.  
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when he does is out of his conscience or declares publicly his/her infringement of the law.6 The 
first is the case of the so-called conscientious objection, the second is the case of civil 
disobedience.  
Conscientious objection is that declared - for instance - by doctors that refuse to procure 
abortion because of their religious or moral beliefs. Civil disobedients are those who judge a 
law to be unjust and are ready to go to prison by breaking that law. Political opposers to war 
conscription during the Vietnam war, or Gandhi’s passive disobedience in occupying the streets 
are example of civil disobedients. Many believe that whistleblowing should be either a form of 
conscientious objection or a form of civil disobedience. What these arguments have in common 
is that a moral whistleblower should come to public. Is it really so? 
Consider the case of those who criticise or gossip about someone else behind their shoulders 
but would never do it in front of the person they gossip about. We condemn this behaviour 
partly because we find coward or immoral to criticise someone without that person knowing it 
and being able to reply. The same we may say the whistleblower who remained anonymous, 
like Chelsea Manning for instance. If a whistleblower is in good faith, then he must be read to 
confront the legal consequences of breaking the law, even when he thinks that the law is unjust. 
The reason behind this though is that the whistleblower is just a civil disobedient, who faces 
legal justice in order to bring public attention to his disclosures and in force of a superior sense 
of moral justice Perhaps this is right, but consider again what we said before: a potential 
whistleblower is morally justified in leaking confidential information when he accepts to expose 
himself to the risk of being sanctioned, fired, or even arrested. Does it mean that he must do it? 
Not necessarily, even more when his/her anonymity is precious for being able to leak 
information of public interest. Recall the case of Ed Snowden: this NSA officer started to 
collect documents proving the illicit activities of his agency a year and half before becoming 
public. Keeping himself undercover was crucial to exposing the violations of his agency. He 
was undercover because he was serving the public interest of informing citizens that their rights 
were being violated by their own government.  
Moreover, anonymity is often important to prevent forms of retaliation against 
whistleblowers. This is particularly true in the case of those who report episodes of corruption 
and even more for those very criminals who decide to become informants of the police by 
revealing information on the crimes of the organisation they work for. Thus, to conclude: 
anonymity is not necessarily a way to avoid facing justice; it is often a way for the 
whistleblower to defend his/her personal and professional safety against potential retaliation. 
Shall the law protect anonymous whistleblowers? We can answer this question by 
distinguishing between full and partial anonymity. Fully anonymous is the whistleblower who 
leaks information through channels that keep his/her identity secret. The Wikileaks digital 
platform is for instance one of these channels. Partial anonymity is when the identity of the 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the anonymity and transparency involved in public interest disclosures, see Frederick 
A. Elliston, “Anonymity and Whistleblowing", Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Aug., 1982), 
pp. 167-177; Robert G. Vaughn, The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws, Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing Limited, 2012, chapter 8: incentives.  
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whistleblower is known to the public officials (the police, prosecutors, press etc….) or to the 
review committee of a company, but it is not divulged. Sometimes full anonymity is necessary 
when there are not proper channels of information disclosure and no legal protection is given to 
the whistleblower. But, when these channels are available, we could say that it is a duty of the 
whistleblower to go through them. Sometimes, even when these channels are available, the 
whistleblower may not trust them. In that case, it is open to discussion whether he has the right 
of ‘going public’ and contact the press or other organisations that could help him to bring 
attention to his disclosure. In general, we should say, a legal protection should be given to 
whistleblowers both when no channels of disclosure are available, and at least to those who 
report through channels when these are available.  
Summing up, we have so far introduced and analysed the concept of whistleblowing and we 
have said that if whistleblowers are morally justified, then there should be legal protection for 
them. We now turn to the legal aspects of this phenomenon. We will first review the existing 
legislation on the matter, and finally propose some arguments and recommendations for the 
introduction of legal protection at EU level.  
3. The Current State of Whistleblowing Legislation 
Several international conventions have been signed regarding the protection of subjects 
disclosing information on corruption. Three appear to be most relevant for our discussion.  
First is the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, Merida Convention)7 
which states that “each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system 
appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who 
reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts 
concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention.” (Article 33)  
Second, we have the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions signed in 1997 8  recommends member countries to 
provide accessible channels and appropriate measures to allow reports of bribery, and 
appropriate sanctions for those found guilty. In particular, the Convention recommends to put in 
place accessible channels for the reporting of suspected acts of bribery of foreign public 
officials in international business transactions, and appropriate measures to protect from 
discriminatory or disciplinary action public and private sector employees who report in good 
faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities (article 9). Notice that the 
Convention also requests companies “to provide channels for communication by, and protection 
of, persons not willing to violate professional standards or ethics under instructions or pressure 
from hierarchical superiors, as well as for persons willing to report breaches of the law or 
professional standards or ethics occurring within the company in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds, and should encourage companies to take appropriate action based on such reporting” 
                                                 
7 See: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/. 
8 See: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm 
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(Article 10, section C — clause (v)). It must be noticed however that these are just general 
recommendations that hardly find strict legal enforcement.9  
Whistleblowing in the European Union  
At European level, the legal landscape appears to be quite scattered. Perhaps the most 
important legal document is the Strasburg Convention (“Council of Europe Civil Law 
Convention on Criminal Corruption”) which calls for an extension of the protection granted to 
informants in criminal investigations to those cooperating with investigating authorities in 
white-collar crimes and to those who provide testimony to the offence (Art. 22). The convention 
refers also the establishment of safeguards against ‘unjustified sanctions’ and invites EU 
member states to enact laws against “any unjustified sanction for employees who have 
reasonable grounds to suspect corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to 
responsible persons or authorities.”10  
At state level, only 5 of the 28 EU Member States (less than the 20%) have a legislation 
regulating disclosing procedures and forms of protection for whistleblowers. These members 
are Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, UK, and Ireland.11 Less than 54% of EU-member states 
have only partial legislation,12 and almost a third of EU-member states, have no legislation, or 
very weak forms of protection.13 This clearly indicates an inadequate legal protection afforded 
to whistleblowers in the majority of EU member states.14 So far the Commission has done little 
on this front, despite the recent attention called upon this issue by the European Parliament, and 
the new Juncker commission seems so far to have taken no position in such regard. 
                                                 
9 In an important study by Transparency International — the Global Corruption Barometer — provides 
the extent of corruption (and specifically ‘bribery’) perception. The 2013 Barometer states the perception 
of bribery of more than 114,000 respondents in 107 countries. Among the key findings, across the world, 
an average of 27% of the people interviewed (1 in 4) declared having paid a bribe in the last 12 months 
when interacting with key public institutions and services (Police, Judiciary, Registry, Land Medical in-
stitutions, Education, Tax, Utilities), with the highest percentage (31%) in cases involving the police and 
the judiciary (24%). Moreover, the survey found that the 53% of people think that corruption has in-
creased during the past two years.  
10 Council of Europe - Civil Law Convention on Criminal Corruption. The Convention was adopted on 27 
January 1999 and entered into force on 1 November 2003. See: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?CL=ENG&NT=174 
11 Daniele Santoro, Manohar Kumar, Martina Turola, et al., “Blowing the Whistle on Corruption. Cam-
paign for an European Directive in Defence of Whistleblowers, Summary Report, p. 12. Available on line 
at:  
http://www.restartingthefuture.eu/assets/files/WhistleblowingReport_Restarting%20the%20Future.pdf.  
12 The list includes: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden. In such cases, the procedures of disclosure 
are not are not always clear.  
13 This list includes Croatia, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain. 
14  Transparency International, Whistleblowing in Europe 2013 Report, p. 8, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/whistleblowing_in_europe_legal_protections_for_wh
istleblowers_in_the_eu 
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The matter is even more urgent if one considers that also within the European Institutions 
there is a substantial lack of internal oversight bodies. Last March 2015, the European 
Ombudsman, Emily O’Reillly, has criticised seven European Union institutions for failing to 
update their internal whistleblower rules, over 1 year after they were meant to be in place. These 
rules, which EU bodies were obliged to have put in place by January 2014 – have been adopted 
so far only by The European Commission and European Court of Auditors, while the European 
Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the 
European  
External Action Service, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of 
the Regions, and the European Data Protection Supervisor are yet to do so.15 The absence of 
proper legislation means that often whistleblowers have to resort to external support of 
conventions, treaties etc. 16 The situation appears even paradoxical if we consider that, while EU 
whistleblowers have little protection whiten the European institutions, the internal regulations of 
those same institutions require officials to report fraud, corruption or other information about 
illegal activities.17 Among those who have reported Paul Van Buitinen and Marta Andreasan are 
examples of whistleblowers who have come forward to report cases of irregularities and lack of 
financial systems of accountability within the European institutions.  
Best Practices in the United States  
Interestingly enough, some of the best practices about whistleblowing disclosures against 
corruption come from the United States, where a legal protection for whistleblowers was 
already granted under the False Claim Act (1863).18 New measures were put in place under the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (1989) which protects federal whistleblowers who report cases of 
misconduct in the Government. The purpose of the Act is “to protect for the rights of Federal 
employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the Government by … 
mandating that employees should not suffer adverse consequences as a result of prohibited 
                                                 
15 On this subject, see also the European Union Integrity System Report by Transparency International, 
European Union Integrity System, available at: 
http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/european-union-integrity-system-study/the-euis-report-latest-
news/  
16 For instance, Guyer and Peterson, two experts in the field, write that “EU whistleblowers largely rely 
on their attorneys to advocate a creative concoction of various treaties, regulations, and statutes for pro-
tection from retaliation, often with little success.” See Guyer, T. M. & Peterson, N.F. (2013), The Current 
State of Whistleblowing Law in Europe: A Report by the Government Accountability Project. Available 
at:  
http://www.whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/TheCurrentStateofWhistleblowerLawinEurope.pdf (ac-
cessed on September 1, 2015).  
17 See Articles 22a and 22b of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, which es-
tablish a clear duty of officials within the EU institutions to report cases that are“detrimental to the inter-
ests of the Communities or of conduct relating to the discharge of professional duties which may consti-
tute a serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials of the Communities.” 
18 And subsequently updated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.  
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personnel practices” (Section 2, (a)).19 The Act appoints a special bureau, the Office of Special 
Counsel, an independent federal investigative and prosecutorial agency, whose basic authority 
come from federal statutes in addition to the Whistleblower Protection Act. 20  The OSC’s 
primary mission is to protect federal employees and applicants from the consequences of being 
forced to engage prohibited personnel practices, especially retaliation for whistleblowing.21 
Along with the OSC activities under the Whistleblower Protection Act, the Dodd-Frank 
Act,22 introduced an important set of measures designed to hold Wall Street accountable and 
prevent another financial meltdown. A core element of this reform was a strong whistleblower 
protection, which corporations vehemently opposed.  
The US best practices highlight two aspects EU should take in granting proper protection to 
whistleblowers. First, protection should be granted at the European level in order to commit 
those Member States where legislation does not exist to take action, and those were legislation 
is granted (whether partially or fully) towards a path of integration. Second, a framework law 
should establish effective incentives that would increase the number of disclosures, as well as 
motivate potential whistleblowers to report. Among these measures, one is particularly 
important: this is the so-called qui tam rule, which establish a premium payable to 
whistleblowers for reporting cases of corruption. The premium is calculated as a percentage of 
the amount retrieved following the report. The rule applies only in some cases, for instance 
under the False Claim Act cited above.  
4. A European Directive on Whistleblowing 
The overview of the legal landscape shows that e whistleblower protection at EU level and 
in single member states is indeed inadequate under many respects. Legislation, when it exists, 
does not provide sufficient protection for potential whistleblowers to feel safe in exposing 
themselves.  
Second, the conventions and statutes we have reviewed so far apply only to whistleblowers 
that report corruption, and say nothing about disclosures involving governments’ secret 
information. The reason probably lies in the tendency of the governments not to be subjected to 
                                                 
19 “Blowing the Whistle on Corruption”, p. 16.  
20Civil Service Reform Act, the Hatch Act, and the Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment 
Rights Act (USERRA).  
21 See OSC website at https://osc.gov/Pages/about.aspx. Consider that Edward Snowden’s leaks are not 
protected under such act because he did not reveal a misconduct in the activities of the NSA, neither he 
appealed to the OCS. Quite the contrary, Snowden has been accused of stealing government’s property, 
namely classified documents created as part of the surveillance activity under the Patriot and Homeland 
Security Acts. A Military Whistleblower Protection Act was also enacted in 1998, and subsequently re-
vised in 2013. This Act provides protection to lawful disclosures by internal channels of illegal activity 
by members of the US Army. However, Manning, who was a military, did not follow the procedures 
guaranteed by the Act, so he could not find protection under this law. His leaking were charged instead 
under the Espionage Act.  
22 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173) signed by 
Barack Obama on July 2010. 
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unrestrained control over their powers. Yet, blowing the whistle on state crimes is not less 
relevant to citizens than corruption. Knowing whether government’s acts made on behalf of its 
citizens is a basic principle of transparency every democracy should honour. Moreover, since 
we citizens rightly demand transparency in financial transactions, business and public 
administration, we are equally entitled to the same demand towards our governments. 
Third, the issue concerning the competence of European institutions is crucial for the 
prospects of feasible legislating measures towards the protection of whistleblowers within the 
Union, also because the credibility of the European Union on this matter depends on the 
capacity of its own institutions to be subjected to the same principle of transparency. 
In the light of these considerations, we hold that democratic institutions should protect 
whistleblowers, political and civic, and ensures around them a perimeter of rights for their 
safeguard. This, we hold, is a political duty the European Union should uphold as a 
consequence of its commitment to the promotion of human rights. We in fact believe that the 
right to protection of whistleblowers corresponds to a fundamental human right that cannot be 
conditional on the policy and legislation of the individual states.23 
The establishment of legal provisions at EU level in defence of whistleblowers will also 
reflect the globalised dimension of corruptive as well secretive practices, whose impact exceeds 
beyond national borders. Illicit financial flows impact poor countries who have no say in the 
policy process, and cannot seek redress. Likewise, where no measures of accountability are in 
place to prevent the abuse of mass surveillance, citizens remain unaware of the extent to which 
their privacy and fundamental rights (including freedom of speech and movement) are 
endangered. The revelations by Edward Snowden made it manifest that the worldwide scope of 
these abuses were not just the product of fiction writers.  
A European directive on whistleblowing would suggest that the member states and the 
European institutions are willing to take a stance on these matters. So far little has been done, as 
we recalled in the previous section, perhaps partly because of the little interest governments 
have in identifying a legal category that would ensure protection also of those government 
whistleblowers who reveal controversial undisclosed information. However, the urgency of 
more effective measures against corruption, both domestic and international is part of the EU 
agenda, and an effective protection of civic whistleblowers should be part of that agenda. The 
challenge is then to convince the governments and European institutions that an overarching 
legislation in defence of whistleblowers would contribute to public interest, over and beyond the 
concerns about security governments may have in this matter. The members of the European 
Parliament should promote a directive that addresses this crucial gap. In the following section I 
                                                 
23 In a public statement on the whistleblower Edward Snowden, the UN Human Rights High Commis-
sioner Navi Pillay asked every country to protect the rights of those who uncover abuses and stressed the 
need to respect the right for people to seek asylum. Navi Pillay’s statement on Snowden’s affair on July 
2013, available at: http://rt.com/news/un-chief-snowden-protection-048.  
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discuss a set of recommendations for a European Directive on the Protection of 
Whistleblowing.24 
The general principles of a European Directive on Whistleblowing 
The Charter of Human Rights of the European Union provides a framework for the 
protection of whistleblowing in virtue of its reference to citizens’ right to participation, freedom 
of expression and their right to information.25 Failing to create institutional and legal channels 
for whistleblowing would violate the right to free speech of the employees. This aspect 
overrides the clause of confidentiality required under employment contracts. If the information 
pertains to public interest, then it is in the interest of the citizens at large to know. If such 
information is not provided, then not only their right to know is being violated, but also their 
possibility of participating in matters of grave import is being denied. Therefore, it is a duty of 
the state to both protect and facilitate channels of whistleblowing.  
Such a duty, we believe, ought to be extended also to those kinds of revelations that might 
pertain to national security in conditions where information concealed is of vital public interest. 
Indeed, corruption does not only nestle in the appropriation of public funds for personal benefit, 
but also where public institutions and public platforms are utilised to serve certain vested 
interests or interests that run contrary to the interests of democracy at large and interests of 
public in particular. In this regard if certain information which is concealed on the grounds of 
national security or due to rationale of emergency should be shared with the public if it is in 
their interest to know. So whistleblowing on information of this sort should be accorded the 
same protection and whistleblowers should not be tried for treason or espionage, rather the 
information should be utilized to act against erroneous officials. Therefore, the classification of 
information under the heading of national security does not mean that it should be off bounds of 
public especially if the information consists of grave wrong-doing, or is used to protect officials 
involved in gross human rights violations. This is particularly the case when the information 
consists of illegal and unauthorised instances of data mining and privacy rights violations, and 
when information reveals democratic deficits of the kind where normal constitutional checks 
and balance do not work. In all these cases, the burden of justification for classifying 
information should be on the classifying authority, and not on the whistleblower. 
A call for a coordinated action. Some policy recommendations  
Whistleblowers are subjected to discrimination, bullying, dismissal, detention, even physical 
threats. Whistleblowers must be protected against such kinds of retaliation in all Member States 
and within European Institutions. To this purpose:  
                                                 
24 A longer list of this recommendations were formulated for the campaign Restarting the Future promot-
ed by the Italian NGO Libera. 
25 This is the opinion of Transparency International’s expert Mark Worth. See: 'Most of Europe has no 
whistleblower protection', Deutsche Welle, accessed on Nov 30, 2014, available at: 
http://www.dw.de/most-of-europe-has-no-whistleblower-protection/a-16942870. 
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- the Directive should ensure full confidentiality in the workplace, granting that the 
whistleblower’s identity attends to strict procedures of consent request;  
- the Directive should ensure that each private and public organisation organise mandatory 
whistleblower trainings in the workplace, and provide educational projects in schools 
with the support of civil society organisations;  
- moreover, the Directive should ensure that media organisations and the press that come in 
possession of leaked information should not be subjected to investigation, nor should be 
forced to reveal the identity of the whistleblower. 
 
Whistleblowing is substantially discouraged in absence of procedures that ensure effective and 
accessible reporting mechanisms. Since uncertainty is an obstacle to disclosures, private and 
public entities should ensure that their revelations will be given due course, and all the 
necessary support be provided to facilitate their work.  
To this purpose, the Directive should operate on three fronts:  
- First, it should request member States to pass legislation for public and private 
organisations to the purpose of establishing internal disclosure channels. Corporate codes 
of conduct must formulate clear formal procedures and identify a dedicated office for 
disclosures. Public and private organisations should also inform their employees on 
whistleblowing policies. Along with this, public and private organisations should devise 
procedures that, in case of sanctions against an employee who has blown the whistle, 
requires employers to prove that these sanctions were not related to the employee’s 
reports. 
- Second, the Directive should request Member States to establish a national authority for 
whistleblowing, external to the workplace, the whistleblower can appeal when internal 
reviewing committees reveal ineffective in conducting preliminary investigation. Such 
authorities should also have the power to promote action against officials in absence of 
due diligence investigation within the public or private organisation, when sufficient 
evidence is collected of a potentially unlawful conduct by these officials. The national 
authorities should also guarantee the availability of anonymous reporting, such as a free-
toll number or web portals that can receive and investigate claims. These channels should 
always guarantee full confidentiality of data and identity, including but not limited to data 
encryption. The Directive should include the possibility of awards for whistleblowers that 
have not taken part to misdeeds, and explore suitable measures for sentence mitigation for 
those who decide to disclose wrongdoings they helped commit, depending on the 
seriousness of the offence. 
- Third, since coordination at European level is essential, a competent European Authority 
for Whistleblowing should be establish to monitor the whistleblowing policies and 
legislative implementation within the Member States and in European Institutions; 
coordinate national authorities in Member States, and build an open access European 
database collecting the data at national and European level.  
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- Finally, measures should be envisaged within the Directive to recognise the right to 
asylum to those whistleblowers seeking protection abroad.26  
Recent Developments in the European Parliament 
In an important Resolution adopted last 25 November 2015 (2015/2066(INI)), also the 
European Parliament called on the European Commission to propose to propose, by June 2016, 
an EU legislative framework for the effective protection of whistleblowers.27 The proposal 
reflects some important recommendations set out above. In particular, the EU Parliament 
stressed that “it is not acceptable that citizens and journalists can be subject to prosecution 
rather than legal protection when, acting in the public interest, they disclose information or 
report suspected misconduct, wrongdoing, fraud or illegal activity.” (144) 
Notably, the Parliament mentioned the US legislation recommending the Commission to 
consider a range of tools for ensuring such protection against unjustified legal prosecution, 
economic sanctions and discrimination, while also ensuring the protection of confidentiality and 
trade secrets; draws attention, in this connection, to the example of the US Dodd-Frank Act, 
which both remunerates whistleblowers for providing the authorities with original information 
and protects them from legal prosecution and job loss, bearing in mind that such remuneration 
should not be a stimulus for publishing business-sensitive information. (145)  
In the Resolution, the Parliament proposed the institution of an independent European body 
responsible for collecting this information and carrying out investigations, and of a pan-
European whistleblower common fund to provide whistleblowers with financial assistance, 
stressing that protection should be granted to whistleblowers “in case they inform the public 
after the competent authorities at national or EU level were notified, after no reaction within one 
month.”  
Conclusion 
In this report we argued that whistleblowing protection is essential to the democracy in the 
European Union. Even more, given shared commitment to democracy and human rights, we 
urge European institutions to join the effort to promote these proposed measures. Such 
protection is essential both in the fight against corruption, and for the protection of government 
whistleblowers who report cases of crimes and law infringements committed by States under 
secrecy laws. Especially for what concerns the anti-corruption policies, the European Union has 
an institutional duty to look beyond the existing mechanisms in fighting corruption. Since actual 
                                                 
26 This matter is highly sensitive, as it involves again Snowden’s position. While on the run from Hong 
Kong where he had hidden himself soon after the revelations came out in public, he sought protection in 
several European countries, including France and Italy, which rejected the request. See: 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/438825/italy-france-deny-asylum-for-snowden. For an informed assessment 
of the asylum legislation in Europe, see Marco Cellini, “The European Refugees Crisis: How to Address 
it”, available on this website. 
27 European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on tax rulings and other measures similar in 
nature or effect (2015/2066(INI)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0408+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
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whistleblowing mechanisms, where they exist, are designed exclusively as protective measures, 
they appear insufficient to contrast a phenomenon whose magnitude is often hard to calculate. 
Incentive schemes have revealed to be effective in supporting the efforts in fighting corruption. 
For instance, US best practices are exemplary cases of how to incentivise whistleblowing 
disclosure done in the public interest. Our recommendation is advocate at EU level a common 
legislation that incorporates the lesson of these practices.  
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